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REAL ESTATE BROKERS: CONTINUING COMMISSIONS AND
THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
A REAL estate broker, when he brings two parties together as landlord and
tenant, catalyzes an economically valuable relationship. In renting small, resi-
dential properties, the broker characteristically is little more than the landlord's
agent.' He lists the offered property and attempts to procure any tenant who
will accept the landlord's terms. 2 The average tenant does his own scouting8
But increased use of the long-term lease to develop valuable urban realty 4
has made private land planners of many brokers who specialize in creating
such leaseholds. Shrewd rental of business property demands expertise.6
1. The terms "broker" and "agent" are often used interchangeably. Dangel, Real
Estate Brokers, 7 L. Soc. J. Supp. (1937). That usage is not wholly accurate. A person
who generally engages in selling, purchasing, financing, or leasing real estate for others
is a "broker." Strictly speaking, he is an "agent" only of a particular client-and only
when the principal has authorized the agency. WALKER, REAL ESTATE AGENCY § 3a (2d
ed. 1922). See also MACCHESNEY, THE LAW Or REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE § 7 (1938).
2. The "listing" creates a unilateral contract under which the landlord agrees to pay
a commission if the broker procures a tenant and/or performs other services stipulated.
MECHEM, OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 560 (4th ed. 1952). For a recent treatment
of problems involved in the listing of realty, see Wallace, Pronzsory Liability Under
Real Estate Brokerage Contracts, 37 IowA L. REv. 350 (1952). Rarely is the listing
contract a bilateral one under which the broker promises to use his "best efforts" to
secure a tenant. But such contracts may be made. PFrFa, NEW YORK LAW OF REAL
ESTATE BROKERAGE 37 (1929) ; WALKER, op. cit. supra note 1, Form #3 (both dealing
with attempts to find purchasers). Usually the broker's only activities in connection with
the listing are to advertise the property and to show potential tenants the premises.
Brokers who list property for rent, however, may also serve as managing agents, In
that capacity they are generally authorized to collect rents, lease premises, pay bills,
and decide on repairs. See page 685 infra.
3. Despite continuing shortages of residential property for rent, "tenant's brokers"
are rare. A random sampling of classified advertisements in The New York Times in-
dicates that brokers advertise extensively properties they have listed for landlords, but
they do not advertise tenants' wants.
4. See Comment, 48 YALE L. J. 1400 (1939).
Property owners may prefer long-term leases to outright sales for a variety of rea-
sons. Much valuable urban realty is held by institutional investors and others who can
afford to retain ownership for an indefinite period. By leasing, they reap the speculative
rewards of the continuing trend towards urbanization without bearing the hardship of
developing the land. Ownership of the fee in realty leased for a long term may provide
a secure investment. And the lease device may offer tax advantages. See NIEluss &
FISHER, PROBLEMtS OF LONG TEMu LEASES 1-3 (Michigan Business Studies #8, 1930).
Potential property users, in turn, may prefer to rent rather than buy. By doing so
they may minimize the initial outlay required. And as a means for financing the occupancy
of costly property, continuing rental payments may be more attractive than available
mortgage terms. Ibid.
5. NORTH, REAL ESTATE SELLING AND LEASING 131 (1938). Real estate brokers who
merely sell or lease small residential property are also planners to some extent, they
must fit people to property. See SEMENow, SuRVEY OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS LICENSE
LAWS 13-16 (1941). But the complex variables which brokers dealing in business prop-
REAL ESTATE BROKERS
Hence a landowner often hires a broker to find the tenant who can utilize
the land most efficiently.6 Or a would-be tenant may employ a broker to find
the most advantageous location for his enterprise.7 In either case, the broker
is called upon to assume a large part of the responsibility for creating a satis-
factory relationship.8 In order to make a wise decision, he may undertake
surveys of available resources, analyze neighboring land uses, and even collect
parcels for his principal.9 The broker's skill in performing his function often
determines the economic value of the leased realty.
Courts generally feel that the broker should be compensated for the effort
he expends. Standard doctrine holds him entitled to remuneration as soon
as he has found a party "ready, willing, and able" to rent.'0 When the party
engaging the broker then refuses to enter into a lease, courts grant the broker
an action to recover commissions." Only a contract denying the broker such
a right will evoke a different judicial response.'-
erties must take into account make their efforts more like those of planners. See Fisun,
PRINCIPLES OF RFaL ESTATE Pr.crIcE 41 (1925). See also note 9 infra.
6. See, e.g., Williams & Co. v. Groverville Corp., 256 App. Div. 683, 11 N.Y.S2d
413 (1st Dep't 1939). From the landlord's point of view, this means finding the use that
will result in the greatest rental. See note 9 infra.
7. See, e.g., Doll v. Albert Weiblen Marble & Granite Co., 207 La. 769, 22 So2d
59 (1945).
Often the plan to lease a particular location will emanate from the broker. See, e.g.,
Haber v. Bond Stores, 178 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1949) ; BENsoN & Noarn, REAL ESTATE
PRINCIP .s AND PRACTICES 140 (1925); *MCMIcHAEL, LEASEs PERCENTAGE, Snor AND
LONG TER 246-8 (4th ed. 1947). For an account of the planning of a recent large trans-
action by a broker and a description of the complexities that may be involved in complet-
ing a real estate deal, see Kahn, Profilc-Opcnings and Closings II, The New Yorker,
Feb. 20, 1954, pp. 44, 55-61.
Generally a broker cannot act as agent for both landlord and tenant at the same time.
Cf. note 1 supra. By attempting to do so he forfeits commission recoveries, unless both
principals have assented to his dual agency. MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 502-03.
8. NORT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1-3, 131-3.
9. Brokers who seek desirable tenants must weigh a variety of potential business
uses. See BABcocK, VALuArTioN orF REAL ESTATE 56-9 (1932) ; I -ssIu, REAL ESTATE
APPRAISAL AND VALUATION C. 14 (1933).
Techniques for evaluating locations are quite advanced. See, e.g., discussion of the
Wezlich studies of pedestrian traffic in McMxcH.AL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 92-9. See
also RATCLIFr, UnRAN LAND EcoNo:Mcs c. 13 (1949). And the tenant's need to be near
his markets or sources of supply are carefully evaluated. See Nonrn, op. cit. supra note
5, at 368.
10. E.g., Cohen v. Ames, 205 Mass. 186,91 N.E. 212 (1910). See NELSON, LAW oF REAL
ESTATE BROKERAGE §§93, 103 (1928); PFEIFFER, op. cit. supra note 2, §§59-62;
ScHwA Tz, BROKERAGE AND EMIPLOYMENT CONTRACrS 125 (1942) ; WALKER, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 204. A number of problems concerning the meaning of "ready, willing, and able"
have produced a prodigious amount of litigation.
11. Merwin v. Shaffner, 31 Cal. App. 374, 160 Pac. 634 (1916); Milten Y. Rapaport,
339 Ill. App. 509, 90 N.E2d 297 (1950) ; Magann v. Lawlor Bros. Theatre Co., 312 Mass.
317, 44 N.E.2d 774 (1942) ; Tanenbaum v. Remford Corp., 185 Misc. 612, 57 X.Y.S2d
415 (Sup. Ct. 1945). See also ScHwARTz, op. ci. supra note 10, at 197-8.
12. Many brokerage contracts delay payment of commissions by making them con-
ditional upon the tenant's payment of rent. See page xxx infra.
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When the broker's efforts have produced a consummated lease, he has an
unquestioned right to a commission ;13 but the amount to which he is entitled
may remain in issue. Execution of a brokerage contract setting compensation
frequently precedes the closing of a lease.14 In contracting, the broker and the
leasing parties typically intend to make the broker's pay reflect the success of
the lease relationship-its economic value to the parties.'5  This value is gen-
erally taken to be the total rental under the lease; the broker's commission
is usually a percentage thereof.'" Thus his fee increases as the dimensions of
the leasing transaction expand and his skill becomes more crucial, Even where
the tenant has hired the broker to find a landlord, higher rental usually breeds
a brokerage contract calling for a higher commission. 1 7 Where no express
brokerage contract has been made, the "ready, willing, and able" doctrine
In the absence of agreement to the contrary, of course, the broker's action for com-
missions runs against the party that hired him. E.g., Doll v. Albert Weiblen Marble &
Granite Co., 17 So.2d 313, 315 (La. Ct. App. 1944), rev/d, 207 La. 769, 22 So,2d 59
(1945) ; MEcHEM, op. cit. supra note 2, § 560. Customarily, however, the landlord agrees
to pay for the broker's services, even where the tenant originally hired the broker. See,
e.g., Doll v. Albert Weiblen Marble & Granite Co., supra at 314. Where the tenant is a
responsible business firm, such as a chain store organization, or where a long term lease
vests much of the control over the property in the tenant, the broker may contract to
receive his commissions from the tenant. Interviews with brokers in New Haven, Con-
necticut and New York City during the Spring of 1953 (hereinafter cited as INTERVIEWS).
13. To recover commissions, a broker must show that his efforts were the "procur-
ing cause" of the creation of the lease relationship. Weinberg v. Smith, 1S2 N.Y. Supp,
1030 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Brumfield v. Pottier & Stymus Mfg. Co., 1 Misc. 92, 20 N.Y.
Supp. 615 (City Ct. 1892) ; De Bolt v. Pointer, 204 Okla. 167, 228 P.2d 182 (1951). The
same rule prevails where the broker seeks to recover commissions on sales. See, e.g(.,
SEMENOW, PENNSLYVANIA LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE, LANDLORD AN) TENANT 43
(1931) ; WALKER, op. cit. mtpra note 1, § 446.
14. INTERVIEWS. More often than not, the broker's contract is made when the prop-
erty is first listed. See note 2 supra. But the contract may be modified or made more
specific at the time of closing. INTERviEws.
15. BENSON & NORTH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 139. This conforms to practice in
regard to compensation for many other services, such as attorney's fees. See WooD, FEE
CONTRAcrs OF LAWYERS 84-91 (1936).
16. WALKER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 196. See also the Real Estate Board Commis-
sion Rules collected in MCMIcHAEL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 547-54.
Since leases vary greatly in dividing between landlord and tenant the host of obliga-
tions connected with the ownership of land, the term "total rental" glosses over a multi-
tude of problems. No attempt will be made here to catalogue non-cash items which may
be considered rent. Real Estate Board rules in a few cities deal with some of these prob-
lems. See, e.g., rules for Indianapolis, Indiana and Salt Lake City, Utah, cited in Mc-
MICHAEL, Op. cit. supra note 7, at 549, 552. See also note 89 infra and accompanying
text. In many instances, the cash payments from the tenant to the landlord are the basis
on which the broker's commission is computed. But in other cases, non-cash items must
be considered. See page 679 infra.
17. See, e.g., Doll v. Albert Weiblen Marble & Granite Co., 207 La. 769, 22 So.2d
59 (1945); E. 0. Bailey & Co. v. Union Planters Title Guaranty Co., 33 Tenn. App.
439, 232 S.W.2d 309 (1949).
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again assures the broker of reasonable compensation.' 8 Local custom, as
formulated in Real Estate Board rules,' 9 decrees what amount is reasonable.20
By relying on Board rules, courts fix remuneration at a percentage of total
rent,2 1 thereby simulating the intent normally underlying express contracts.
Computing the broker's commission at the inception of the lease may lead
to inaccuracy. If figured then, compensation is geared to the expected value
of the relationship; the broker receives a percentage of the total rents called
for by the lease.2 But subsequent events may alter the actual value of the
18. Where no express contract was proven, some courts have spoken of brokers'
claims as suits on the common counts. Lyne v. Warriner, 44 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1950);
Mullen & Woods, Inc. v. 615 W. 57th St., 144 Misc. 697, 259 N.Y. Supp. 250 (Munic.
Ct. 1932), rev'd, 146 Misc. 599, 262 N.Y. Supp. 467 (Sup. Ct. 1933). See ScawARTZ, op. Cit.
supra note 10, at 233. Regardless of terminology, the broker must prove at least an im-
plied contract of agency before he can recover. See 6 INmhAm.rTAL (N.Y.U.) L. RE,. 249
(1951). Even where the broker's contract is express, the commission rate is often not
stated. Courts must fill in the ambiguity. SnMENowV, PE .NSxLVATTIA LAw op REAL
EsrArE BROKERAGE, LANDLORD AND TENANT 15-18 (1931).
By enacting statutes of frauds, some states have barred actions by brokers to recover
on oral brokerage contracts. For a compilation of relevant statutes, see 2 Cormn, Co.-
mancrs 437 n.92 (1950). But such statutes generally have been held to apply only to
actions for commissions on sales, and not to commissions on leases. Klie v. Hollstein,
98 N.J.L. 473, 120 Atl. 16 (1923); cf. Jaffe v. New York Towers, 103 N.Y.S.2d 193
(City Ct. 1951). And additional commissions sought by the broker when the tenant pur-
chases the premises are outside the statute. Burt v. Brownstone Realty Co., 95 X.J.L
457, 112 Atl. 8R-3 (1921); 2 ConriN, CoNmAcrs 438 (1950). For discussion of other
problems connected with oral agreements, see note 74 infra.
19. Real Estate Boards are private associations of local real estate men, often in-
cluding owners and mortgage holders as well as brokers. FisnER, PixNciP.Es oF REAL
EsTrArE PRAcricE 254 (1925). Many local boards are affiliated with the National Asso-
ciation of Real Estate Boards. The local boards promulgate suggested-often minimum-
brokerage fees. See United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339
U.S. 485, 438, 494 (1950).
20. E.g., Johnson v. McLean, 19 So.2d 581 (La. Ct. App. 1944); Grether v. Di-
Franco, 178 S.W2d 469 (Mo. App. 1944). In the Grether case the court held that, since
the local Real Estate Board's rate had not been shown to be unreasonable, the amount
fixed by the Board was the only amount which a jury could reasonably find as damages.
See also Thomas v. Piedmont Realty & Development Co., 195 N.C. 591, 143 S.E. 144
(1928).
Parties may specifically contract to be bound by Board rules. E.g., Jack E. Cloyd Co.
v. Taber, 102 Cal. App. 384, 282 Pac. 979 (1929) ; Mitchnik v. Brennan, 159 'Misc. 287,
286 N.Y. Supp. 609 (Munic. Ct. 1936).
21. Real Estate Board rules almost invariably set commissions for leasing at a per-
centage of rental. The percentages often vary with the size of the total rent. In New
York City, for example, the suggested percentage rate for leases involving more than
$1,000,000 in rentals is lower than that for smaller leases. And the percentage rate
generally is smaller for a long term lease than it is for a short one. See Mc UCHAEX.,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 547-54.
22. In this situation the broker receives a percentage of all the rental which the
tenant unconditionally obligates himself to pay. Jack E. Cloyd Co. v. Taber, 102 Cal.
App. 384, 282 Pac. 979 (1929). He does not initially receive a percentage of rent attribu-
1954]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
relationship. That value will increase if the leasing parties later agree to in-
crease rental rates.2 Conversely, the actual value may decline; the tenant
may fail to pay rent. In any such event, the broker has received a sum not
representing a standard percentage of the benefit which the parties derive
from the lease.
Nevertheless, the broker may be paid when the lease is closed. He has an
enforceable right to a commission at that time,24 unless the brokerage contract
expressly provides otherwise.2 5 And in many instances, the parties do not
care to write a contract delaying payment of the broker. 20 When a small,
short-term lease is involved, making multiple payments is impractical. The
chances of substantially overpaying the broker are minimal. And the broker
may be content to settle for immediate and certain payment, even though by
waiting he might receive more. In the small lease situation, therefore, the
broker is normally paid in full 27 when the lease is signed.2 When he becomes
thus obligated to a broker, the landlord often requires the tenant immediately
to make an extra payment sufficient to cover his expenses, 29 including the
brokerage commission. Termed "security rental," this amount is considered
a pre-payment of rent for a period ending the lease term. 0 This practice is
designed not only to insure the landlord against an out-of-pocket loss upon the
tenant's later nonperformance, but also to deter the tenant from defaulting.
Incidentally it assures the broker of his copnmission.
DEFERRED COMPENSATION CONTRACTS
Parties to a large, long-term lease, however, may not pay the broker his
full commission upon creation of the lease. To do so might be financially
impossible or imprudent. And where the lease calls for rentals computed by
means of a flexible formula, prospective measurement of even the potential
value of the relationship may be impossible..
table to a period for which the tenant is given an option to renew. See text at notes
50, 51 infra. But the broker may recover for the renewal period at some later date. See
page 673 infra.
23. See page 677 infra.
24. The right to commissions may arise even earlier. Courts generally hold the
broker entitled to compensation as soon as he finds a party "ready, willing, and able."
See text at note 10 supra. Certainly the broker's action is mature by the time the lease
is closed.
25. Many brokerage contracts make the duty to pay the broker conditional upon the
tenant's paying rent. See page 669 infra.
26. INTERVIEwS.
27. But see note 22 supra.
28. INTERVIEWS.
29. MCMIcHAEL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 15.
Of course, a pre-payment will not serve the purpose of covering broker's commission
expenses when the tenant is to pay the broker. But customarily the landlord assumes
the obligation. See note 12 mupra.
30. MCMICUAEL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 15-16.
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"If, As, and When" Agreements
The very size of the brokerage commission may preclude immediate pay-
ment in full. The broker's fee for creating a long-tern lease may be impos-
ing.32 And frequently the leasing parties need their money for other business
purposes, such as the erection of a building on the leased premises. 2 In that
event, the broker may forego a lump-sum payment, and contract instead to
accept installments payable during the lease term.-3 Where present lack of
funds is the contracting parties' only concern, the size of each installment
is computed when the lease is closed.2 4
The parties may, however, be concerned not only about the size of the
broker's commission, but also about predicting the success of a long-term lease-
hold. Such a lease's actual value may turn out to be substantially less than its
potential value appeared to be.35 If so, pre-payment to the broker will have
constituted a significant over-payment. And because the value of the long-term
lease depends so heavily on the broker's skill in setting it up, the leasing parties
may want the broker to share the risk of success. Under these circumstances,
the broker signs a contract which entitles him to a percentage of each rental
payment only "if, as, and when" it is actually made. 0
As written, an "if, as, and when" contract is intended to mirror precisely
the actual value of the lease relationship; the tenant's failure to pay rent for
any reason will cut off the broker's commission. In a similar conte.%t, how-
ever, decisions have tampered with the contractual intent. W1"here a party
who engaged a broker to 'arrange the sale of realty later frustrates the sale,
31. If a lease calls for $100,000 a year rental for 20 years, the current standard
brokerage commission in New York City would amount to "X0,250. REAL EsrATE Bo.,m
oF NEW YoRx, CoMnIISSiON RATEs AND RuLEs (1952).
32. See NORTH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 516.
33. E.g., Jack E. Cloyd Co. v. Taber, 102 Cal. App. 384, 282 Pac. 979 (1929).
34. I.xzvawws. Landlords may be short of funds with which to pay the broker
immediately and may agree to pay him on a fixed future date. See, e.g., Hirshaut v. Ace
Hotel Corp., 270 App. Dlv. 314, 59 N.Y.S2d 753 (3d Dep't 1946) (payment of original
commissions delayed until hotel season).
35. See pages 667-8 supra. Parties often contract for long periods in order to assure
recoupment of money expended to improve and adapt the land for the tenant's use. See
Comment, 48 YA.z L.J. 1400, 1405-8 (1939). But subsequent clmnges in neighboring
uses, available resources, or general changes in the economy, may make continuation of
the lease unprofitable, or less profitable than other uses.
36. E.g., Davis v. Nichols, 124 S.WV2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). The term "if, as,
and when" is only one of many employed in agreements making the broker's commission
contingent upon additional events subsequent to his procuring a party "ready, willing, and
able" to enter into a lease. Terms which have been construed to create such a condition
include: "[commissions payable] out of [rental] money received," Lind v. Huene, 205
Cal. 569, 271 Pac. 1087 (1928); "if and when;' Colleton v. Malmstrom, 8 N.J. Misc.
418,150 AtL 230 (Sup. Ct. 1930). Where the parties contract out of the "ready, willing,
and able" doctrine in the sales situation, an even greater variety of terms is used. See
Note, Special Conditions in Real Estate Brokerage Contracts, 32 CoL L REv. 1194
(1932).
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several courts have ignored "if, as, and when" language. They have allowed
the broker to recover for the reasonable value of his services.Y7 The terms of
the brokerage contract are said not to bar the broker's action, because the
frustrating party is estopped from relying on a contract under which his own
non-performance causes the broker to lose his fee.38 Courts might be tempted
to transport this doctrine into the situation where the broker's client has
caused interruption of a lease relationship. But such an extension would be
ill-advised. "If, as, and when" agreements represent leasing parties' attempts
to escape having to pay sizeable brokerage fees even after the lease relation-
ship has deteriorated. It seems sound to enforce the parties' agreement that
when the relationship created by the broker falters, the broker's commission
shall also suffer. Had the sales cases barred the broker's claim, the broker would
have been denied any compensation for his efforts; fairness thus demanded
a recovery.39 But in the lease context, enforcing an "if, as, and when" agree-
ment as written will seldom mean that the broker gets nothing.40 The broker's
commission will merely be reduced as the success of the relationship wanes.
Contracts Based on Variable Rental Leases
Apart from their desire to share the risk of the lease's success with the
broker, leasing parties may postpone payment of the broker's commission be-
cause even the expected value of the leasehold cannot be computed at its in-
ception. In order to apportion the business risk between landlord and tenant,
many modern commercial leases provide for periodic readjustment of rental
to make it conform to economic fluctuations. 41 Others measure each year's
37. See 43 COL. L. REV. 108 (1943); Note, 32 COL. L. REV. 1194, 1200 (1932);
SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 10, at 189.
38. Stern v. Gepo Realty Corp., 264 App. Div. 265, 35 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep't 1942),
aff'd, 289 N.Y. 274, 45 N.E.2d 440 (1942); Morgan v. Calvert, 126 App. Div. 327, 110
N.Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dep't 1908) ; cf. MEcHEM, op. cit. supra note 2, § 567. Some cases
reach the same result not on an estoppel rationale, but on the ground that the brokdr re-
ceived no consideration when he agreed to forego his right to commissions upon finding
a party "ready, willing, and able." The "if, as, and when" provision is therefore deemed
unenforceable. Cf. Abegglen v. Burnham, 91 F. Supp. 61 (D. Idaho 1950), aft'd, 187
F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1951).
39. See, e.g., Sandefur v. Hines, 69 Kan. 168, 76 Pac. 444 (1904) ; Neff v. Schrader,
49 N.D. 213, 191 N.W. 466 (1922).
40. It would be an unusual case in which the lease relationship had been so poorly
constructed that it collapses before substantial rents-and substantial brokerage com-
missions-have been paid. The pains which brokers take in creating business leases
seem fair assurance that most leases will meet with some success, initially at least. See
text at notes 4-9 supra. And where the lease relationship is abruptly halted by events be-
yond the control of the broker or the leasing parties, the broker should share the risk of
loss.
41. Some leases provide for predetermined "step-ups" or "step-downs" in rent at
specific dates. These leases are not variable rental leases. The broker's commission need
not be withheld, because total rental contracted for by the parties may be computed at
the inception of the lease. True variable leases include "re-appraisal leases," whieh re-
quire a recomputation of rents periodically to account for economic changes not antici-
pated by the original rental rates. See NIEHUSS & FIsHER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 10-20.
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rental as a percentage of the tenant's sales.- Since the broker's commission is
normally computed as a percentage of rental, compensation must be delayed
at least until the amount of rent payable can be ascertained.V 3
When rent is determined by the tenant's sales, some courts permit the
landlord to sue the tenant for damages caused by his failure to engage in
business.4 Presumably the broker could claim his percentage of the damages
awarded to the landlord in such a suit.43 But no court has yet ruled whether
the broker whose compensation is based on rental can bring his own action
for damages against the tenant when the landlord does not sue. Allowing such
a suit would torture third part), beneficiary doctrine. 0 And the tenant's
failure to do business, coupled with the landlord's failure to sue, indicates
that the value of the lease relationship has deteriorated. In these circum-
stances, the broker should not be permitted to recover from the tenant.
EXTENSION OF THE LE s- TEuit
Leasing parties frequently extend their relationship beyond the term for
which they initially bound themselves.47 Extensions may be contemplated in
42. Such leases are known as "percentage leases." MehcAE., op. cit. supra note
7, at 21. But percentage leases do not always base rent upon gross sales. See id. at 29-30
(net earnings over minimum amount) ; BrENNEr, LAw o" LANDLORD A.D TE::A:r, App.
XI (1939) (1 cent per gallon). The great advantage of a well drawn percentage lease is
that it automatically adjusts rent to changes in the leasing parties' economic conditions.
MC'MICIHAEL, op. cit. supra, at 23-4.
43. Many percentage leases guarantee the landlord a minimum fixed rent. Unless the
brokerage agreement conditions payment upon the receipt of rent, the broker will be paid
compensation based on the minimum rent when the lease is closed and will receive addi-
tional compensation in any year in which the tenant pays more than the minimum. But
many big chains today rent on a straight percentage basis, with no minimum rent at all.
INTERVIEWS.
A brokerage contract which calls for payment of commissions more than one year in
the future may come within the provisions of the statute of frauds. See note 74 infra.
44. Hughes v. Robinson, 60 Mo. App. 194 (1895); Goldberg 16-05 Corp. v. Levy,
170 Misc. 292, 9 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1938), nodiied, 256 App. Div. 1086, 11 N.Y.S2d
315 (2d Dep't 1939) ; Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, 134 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939),
25 CopNELL L.Q. 615 (1940) ; Note, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rtv. 284 (1939). Contra: Cousins
Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 113 P2d 878 (1941). The per-
centage lease may include an express covenant embodying the tenant's promise to do
business. See Friedman, Preparation of Leases in PPRcriCING L.Aw I.xsnrrTUT, GEiu=.
PRACTICE SERIES (No. 2, 1946).
45. The broker's theory will be that the damages were awarded in lieu of rents.
Brokers who are compensated under contracts conditioning commissions upon receipt of
rent, or sales price, may recover when the landlord recovers damages for a tenant's or
purchaser's breach. Haber v. Goldberg, 92 N.J.L. 367, 105 Ad. 874 (1918); Grant v.
'McLaughlin, 92 Okla. 51, 217 Pac. 873 (1923).
46. Courts verbalize denial of third party enforcement in terms of "incidental bene-
ficiaries." 4 CoRnix, CoxTRAcrs §779C (1951); 2 Wi.LisToN,, Coi.;n.%c-rs §402 (Rev.
ed. 1936). Here the promise to do business is primarily for the landlord's benefit. But
cf. 61 HRxv. L. Rav. 1054 (1948) (concerning sales).
47. For definitions of extension and renewals and distinctions between them see 1
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the original instrument. Thus the lease may allow one or both of the parties
to lengthen the term by exercising an option to renew or by failing to exercise
an option to terminate .4  In other instances, the parties may extend their
relationship beyond the period anticipated in the first lease arrangement. This
can be accomplished by rewriting the original agreement to make it run for
an additional period,4 9 or -by negotiating a new lease with different provisions.
Any such extension evidences the continued value of the lease relationship.
In no case is the broker entitled to remuneration attributable to extension
of the lease term until such an extension actually occurs.8 0 Under an "if, as,
and when" agreement the broker can claim only his percentage of each rent
payment as it is made.5' And under the "ready, willing, and able" doctrine 62
the broker's compensation at the time of closing is measured only by the rent
which the tenant has unconditionally obligated himself to pay.53
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.85 (Casner ed. 1952) ; Note, 172 A.L.R. 1205 (1948).
The terms will be used interchangeably in this comment. For general coverage of the
problems raised by lease extension, see BENN T, op. cit. supra note 42, §§ 102-112 (1939).
48. Because of uncertainties in business future, businessmen may not be willing to
assume a lease obligation for as long a term as they hope to use the premises profitably.
But especially if the location is an element of their good will, or if moving their business
activity to another location involves great expense, they may desire the power to extend
the lease relationship. When the original lease expires, business may 'be good. For an
example of such a lease, see MCMiCHAEL, op. cit. siupra note 7, at 298.
49. There are several ways of achieving this result. A document Identical with the
original lease save for dates may be executed. Or an agreement may be drawn between
the parties providing that they shall be bound by the provisions of the lease for all addi-
tional time period. Or the tenant may merely remain in possession with the landlord's
consent and continue to meet the obligations of his tenancy. By holding over, however,
the tenant obligates himself for a term identical with that provided in the original lease
only if the rent expressed therein was the total amount due for the entire lease term.
See 1 AMERICANs LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.33-3.35 (Casner ed. 1952).
50. If the lease sets a term but gives the tenant an option to terminate at an earlier
date, the broker may occasionally receive commissions for the entire term. If the tenant
terminates, the broker must return the payment to the extent that it represents com-
missions on the rental qpayments forestalled by the termination. See, e.g., Laughlin v.
Terry, 1.10 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. App. 1937). Although in such a case the broker originally
receives his commissions for the renewal period, he has no unconditional right to them
until the extension is actually made.
51. See page 669 supra.
53. E.g., Laughlin v. Terry, 110 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. App. 1937). Leases may permit
the parties to terminate upon the occurrance of conditions over which they have no con-
trol-fires, for instance. See Lrvis, LAW OF L&SES OF REAL PROPERTY 393 (2d ed. 1930).
As yet no court has held that the "ready, willing, and able" doctrine requires that payment
of commissions be deferred until the non-occurrence of such events is assured. But if the
parties to the lease had some control over the condition such a result might be plausible.
See, e.g., Goldberg 168-05 Corp. v. Levy, 170 Misc. 292, 9 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1938),
modified, 256 App. Div. 1086, 11 N.Y.S.2d 315 (2d Dep't 1,939) (tenant opened another
store to compete with one on leased premises, in order to terminate lease by reducing
sales below minimum rental specified).
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Nevertheless the broker may collect additional commissions at some time
after the lease term is extended. 4 If his contract expressly calls for added
compensation upon an "extension or renewal of the lease," he can frequently
recover.55 At least one early court held such a contract provision unenforce-
able. According to that decision, the broker played no part in effecting the
extension, and hence there was no consideration for the promise to pay him
an additional commission.50 But such reasoning is not persuasive. Even if
the broker does not perform new services by cajoling a reluctant party into
an extension, the parties themselves-by choosing to extend the lease-
indicate that the term for which they had bound themselves understated the
value of the relationship which the broker originally created. Feeling that the
broker deserves an added fee, courts now reason that such payment is merely
part of the consideration for the services which the broker originally ren-
dered.5 7 And where the extension made was contemplated by an option in the
original lease, courts sometimes avoid the consideration problem completely.
They hold that the extension merely transformed the original lease into a lease
for a longer term. 15
Even where a court finds consideration for an "extension or renewal" pro-
vision in a brokerage agreement, the broker will succeed only if the court holds
that the contracting parties intended that provision to cover the particular
extension for which the broker seeks recovery. Where the parties to a lease
devoid of options rewrite the lease to make it run for an additional period, a
general provision in the brokerage contract for added compensation upon ex-
tension will probably support a claim; denying recovery in such a case would
54. If the broker's contract was governed by the "ready, willing, and able" doctrine,
a commission for the period of the renewal would become due as soon as the tenant re-
newed. But if the broker's contract provides for commission payments "if, as, and when"
rents are received, any commissions sought under the contract after a renewal would
become due only as the tenant paid rents.
The broker may also seek additional commissions when the tenant exercises an option
to purchase the premises. Like a renewal, such a purchase usually evidences the success
of the lease. Many of the problems raised by such purchase do not differ from those
encountered in the lease extension situation. Hence, recommendations relating to exten-
sions apply to a purchase by the tenant.
55. E.g., E. 0. Bailey & Co. v. Union Planters Title Guaranty Co., 33 Tenn. App.
439, 232 S.V2d 309 (1949). See ScHvARrz, op. cit. mspra note 10, § 47.
56. Allwin Realty Co. v. Barth, 161 App. Div. 563, 146 N.Y. Supp. 960 (1st Dep't
1914). However, the court conceded that the rule might be different where an option
was exercised. No additional services, such as persuasion, need be given where the original
instrument contemplated extension. Cf. text at note 5S in!fra.
57. Williams v. Heckscher, 126 Misc. 176, 212 N.Y. Supp. 685 (Ist Dep't 1925); -
0. Bailey & Co. v. Union Planters Title Guaranty Co., 33 Tenn. App. 439, 457-8,232 S.W.2d
309, 317 (1949). See also F. Bruce Maiden & Co. v. Lippow, 94 Cal. App. 2d 140, 210
P2d 82 (1949).
58. Johnson v. McLean, 19 So.2d 581 (La. Ct. App. 1944) ; Bashein v. 2632 Broadway,
Inc., 179 Misc. 1040,39 N.Y.S.2d 137 (City Ct. 1942).
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give the contract provision no effect." In addition, courts will interpret such
a provision as embracing an extension made as contemplated in the original
lease--either through exercise of an option to renew or failure to exercise
an option to terminate. 60 It is reasonable to suppose that "extensions" as
used in the broker's contract was intended to refer at least to extensions which
the renting parties anticipated in writing the original lease. But where a lease
containing options is extended beyond the period provided for by options,
courts deny recovery, interpreting the term "extensions or renewals" in the
brokerage contract as intended to cover only renewals anticipated by the
options. 61 In this situation the intent of the contracting parties is certainly
ambiguous.6 2 If the broker wants to collect for extensions beyond those pro-
vided for in the original lease, he should write into his contract an explicit
provision to that effect.6 Since he is generally in a position to draw the
brokerage contract, 64 it would impose no great hardship upon him to require
specific statement.6 5
A more delicate problem of interpretation arises when the leasing parties,
foregoing their opportunity to rely on options or to rewrite the orginal agree-
ment, extend the relationship by executing a new instrument with provisions
different from those of the original. According to property law definition
such a contract is not a "renewal" of the original lease.(" Despite this fact,
59. Where the lease contains no option, the parties cannot renew except by extending
the lease beyond the terms originally contemplated. Hence, the word "renewal" in the
brokerage agreement can refer to nothing except such an extension.
60. Williams v. Heckscher, 126 Misc. 176, 212 N.Y. Supp. 685 (1st Dep't 1925);
Bashein v. 2682 Broadway, Inc., 179 Misc. 1040, 39 N.Y.S.2d 137 (City Ct. 1942). See
ScHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 10, § 47.
61. E.g., Zuzak v. Querbes, 193 So. 208 (La. Ct. App. 1.939).
62. Another ambiguity which brokerage contracts should resolve arises when a lease
expires and a eriod of time elapses before renewal or purchase is made. Some contracts
meet the problem by specifying that the broker shall collect for any extension made with-
in a specific time. See, e.g., Comly v. First Camden National Bank & Trust Co., 22 N.J.
Misc. 123, 36 A.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ("any new lease made within one year of the
expiration hereof"). If no time limit is specified, a lapse of time between expiration of
the original lease and renewal may prevent the broker from recovering additional com-
missions. See Odell v. Wessinger, 54 Ga. App. 838, 189 S.E. 367 (1936) ; Sheild v. Welch,
4 N.J. 563, 73 A.2d 536 (1950).
63. See E. 0. Bailey & Co. v. Union Planters Title Guaranty Co., 33 Tenn. App. 439,
443, 232 S.W.2d 309, 311 (1949) ("for any subsequent lease that may be entered into by the
Lessor with the Lessee covering the within leased premises"). For a contract clearly limit-
ing the broker's recovery to renewals provided for by lease options, see Hirshaut v. Ace
Hotel Corp., 270 App. Div. 314, 59 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dep't 1946) ("for the two renewal
periods mentioned therein").
64. The brokerage contract is usually drawn by the broker. INTMVWEWS. Often it is
a form signed at time of listing. See note 2 supra.
65. See Smith, The Florida Real Estate Broker and his Commission, 3 MIAMI LQ.
424, 431 (1949).
66. For a compilation of opinions defining "renewal," see Note, 172 A.L.R. 1205
(1948). Such a definition has been used in brokerage contract cases. See Mitchnik v.
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however, some courts permit the broker to recover where the new lease is sub-
stantially similar to the original one.G7 The rationale is that denial of recovery
would permit the leasing parties to defraud the broker of his commission
merely by substituting a new piece of paper.68 But where the change in the
lease seems more than a mere sham, the broker's claim has been rejected.o
The existence of a valid business purpose for the change may well induce
denial of recovery.70 And in some cases the lease contemplated extension by
providing options, but the parties choose instead to execute a new lease calling
for a lower rental or a term shorter than that specified by the options. Faced
with such a situation courts have reasoned that there has been no "renewal"
and hence the broker's contract does not entitle him to additional compensa-
tion.71
When leasing parties extend their relationship by executing a new instru-
ment, courts should not be overly restrictive in interpreting "extension or re-
newal" in the brokerage contract. The bare fact that the lease relationship
has been preserved indicates that it has achieved some measare of success-
the standard by which the broker's commission is generally determined. 2
'Whereas parties will probably not discontinue their leasing arrangement solely
to guard against an added brokerage commission, they might well choose to
substitute a new instrument for that purpose. And the terms of the lease
can often be changed to look quite different wvithout making a substantial
change in either party's economic status.
73
Questions relating to the broker's rights upon extension are not limited
to cases where the broker has expressly contracted for commissions upon
extension. If he is not barred by the statute of frauds 74 a broker who has
Brennan, 159 Misc. 287, 286 N.Y. Supp. 609 (Munic. Ct. 1936) ; Sheild v. Welch, 4 N.J.
563, 73 A.2d 536 (1950).
67. Hirshaut v. Ace Hotel Corp., 270 App. Div. 314, 59 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dep't
1946); Rosenblum v. Lurie, 128 Pa. Super. 480, 194 At. 204 (1937). Contra: Harris
v. Buckeye Sheriff Street Realty Co., 35 Ohio Law Abstract 373, 40 N.E.2d 949 (Ct.
App. 1941).
68. E.g., Zuzak v. Querbes, 193 So. 258 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
69. Ernest A. Carrere's Sons v. Levy, 191 So. 747 (La. Ct. App. 1939) (alternative
holding); Harris v. Buckeye Sheriff Street Realty Co., 35 Ohio Law Abstract 373, 40
N.E.2d 949 (Ct. App. 1941) semble.
70. See, e.g., Harris v. Buckeye Sheriff Street Realty Co., 35 Ohio Law Abstract 373,
40 N.E.2d 949 (Ct. App. 1941).
71. Ibid. See Masten Realty Co. v. James, 125 N.J.L 529, 16 Ai2d 464, 465 (Sup.
Ct 1940). Contra: Rosenblum v. Lurie, 128 Pa. Super. 480, 194 Ad. 204 (1937).
72. See page 666 supra.
73. See page 678 infra.
74. The broker's ability to enforce his commission claim may be limited by a statute
of frauds provision requiring that contracts to be performed in more than one year must
be in writing. 2 CoazaN, Coi-rascrs § 444 (1950). Courts have generally construed the
statute as applying only to contracts which could not be performed within one year.
Hence brokerage agreements which provide for additional commissions upon the esercise
of an option to renew do not come within the statute if the option may be exercised
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no express contract with the leasing parties may claim added compensation.
Recovery for extensions in such an event depends on whether the local Real
Estate Board rules, invariably read as barometers of reasonable or customary
compensation, authorize commissions upon extensionY5 Board rules in some
cities sanction an additional fee either upon the exercise of an option to renew
or on failure to exercise an option to terminate. 70 Some boards also authorize
commissions upon non-optional renewals of the lease.
77
On the whole courts have been hesitant to permit brokers to recover com-
missions attributable to lease extensions. This judicial animus apparently
stems from a fear of spawning infinite or near-infinite series of commission
recoveries.7 8 In theory at least, a successful relationship might be extended
forever. 79  Permitting the broker to iecover for extensions made decades
after the leasehold's inception not only would saddle the relationship with an
expense far beyond the original parties' expectations, 80 but might also allow
within one year. Bashein v. 2682 Broadway, Inc., 179 Misc. 1040, 39 N.Y.S.2d 137 (City
Ct. 1942); Williams v. Heckscher, 126 Misc. 176, 212 N.Y. Supp. 685 (1st Dep't 1925),
But the agreement must be in writing if the amount of the broker's additional commis.
sion cannot be determined within one year-as where he collects upon a percentage lease,
Jaffe v. New York Towers, 108 N.Y.S.2d 193 (City Ct. 1951), or upon an extension the
rental for which is to be set by an appraisal, Mullen & Woods v. 615 West 57th Street,
144 Misc. 697, 259 N.Y. Sfzpp. 250 (Munic. Ct. 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 146 Misc.
599, 262 N.Y. Supp. 467 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
In many instances, of course, the broker will attempt to collect on a contract which is
written, but which is mute on the effect of a renewal. In such a case, the statute of
frauds should be no problem. Allowing the broker to recover is merely a matter of en-
forcing the written contract according to the parties' contractual intent; it is not allowing
enforcement of an oral agreement. But cf. Schulz & Co. v. Realty Associates, 17 N.Y.S.2d
924 (Munic. Ct. 1940).
75. See Johnson v. McLean, 19 So.2d 581 (La. Ct. App. 1944); but cf. Schulz &
Co. v. Realty Associates, Inc., 17 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Munic. Ct. 1940) (general brokerage
contract not calling for commissions upon renewal, and an option in the lease for the
tenant did not support a suit for additional commissions). Granting that no problem of
consideration is raised in the attempt to recover additional compensation, see page 673
supra, the applicable legal principles should be no different from those applying to any
contract in which the compensation is not stated, or is stated ambiguously. See note 18
sa pra.
76. See, e.g., rules for Buffalo, New York (option to renew), and Chicago, Illinois
(tenant's option to cancel), in McMIcHAE-., op. di. supra note 7, at 548, 551.
77. See, e.g., rules for Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Los Angeles, California. Many
board rules merely state that commissions are payable on "renewals." See, e.g., Brook-
lyn, New York; Columbus, Ohio. The New York City rules suggest a written agree-
ment stipulating additional commissions for renewals. Id. at 547-52.
78. See, e.g., Mitchnik v. Brennan, 159 Misc. 287, 286 N.Y. Supp. 609 (Munic. Ct.
1936).
79. Leases providing for perpetual renewals, for example, are valid. BENNnrr, op.
cit. supra note 42, § 106.
80. It may be difficult to distinguish between increases in the value of the landlord's
interest which result from the broker's leasing of the premises, and those which result
from other factors. But except for the transaction in which a particular use creates its
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recovery against a leasing party wholly unaware of his liability on a contract
made years before.8 ' Although continued brokerage recoveries may be theo-
retically justifiable,8 2 brokers' insistence on receiving commissions as long
as extensions are made seems certain to prejudice their chances of recovering
for any renewals at all. Brokers should therefore bow to judicial bent. Con-
tracts can be written to put a time limit on commission recoveries.8 To cope
with cases in which the broker's contract contains no such limitation or where
the broker has no express contract, Real Estate Boards should adopt rules
putting a time limit on commission recoveries.84 Board rules would provide
"reasonable" or "customary" limits for courts to read into ambiguous or
implied contracts. And they would go far toward giving land holders and
their lawyers warning that continued brokerage commissions are possible
unless expressly denied by contract.
RENEGOTIATION OF LEASE PROVISIONS
Changes in economic conditions and business needs may lead to a voluntary
renegotiation of the renting agreement during the lease term.8 5 If the broker's
compensation is governed by the "ready, willing, and able" doctrine courts
view the brokerage contract as a simple employment contract.80 Hence altera-
own "neighborhood," for instance, where the erection of a large department store assures
a shopping district, changes in the value of a location should not accrue to the broker's
benefit
81. Cf. Heard v. Miles, 32 Tenn. App. 410, 222 S.V.2d 848 (1949), where the court
refused enforcement of the broker's claim for additional commissions upon a sale to the
tenant, on the ground that the broker breached his "fiduciary" duty of notifying the
owner before the sale was consummated of the broker's right to compensation.
82. See page 686 infra.
83. Such a limitation need not be formulated in terms of options in the lease as in
the Hirshaut case, supra note 63, but may also be stated-perhaps with less ambiguity-
if it simply limits the broker's commission to a percentage of rentals payable before a
certain date.
84. Some Board rules already limit the broker's recovery. See rules for Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (commissions for renewals limited to 5 years, or the length of the original
lease, whichever is longer) ; Dallas, Texas (same); Chicago, Illinois (amount limited in
relation to first year's rent) ; San Francisco, California (commissions limited to amount
broker would have collected if premises sold), cited in McfzcmAE, op. cit. Jupra note
7, at 546-53.
85. The term "renegotiation" is used here to include agreements between the landlord
and tenant to rescind the old lease and write a new agreement, and mere failure on the
part of the landlord to enforce terms of the old lease. On rescission and modification of
leases, see NEw Yore LAw OF LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 963 et seq. (Thompson, Ed-
ward, Co. ed. 1937) ; BENNET, op. cit. supra note 42, §§ 14, 37 ct seq. (1942).
"Renewals," which result in continuation of the landlord and tenant's relationship be-
yond the original term, can only arbitrarily be separated from renegotiation--changing
the provisions of the lease relationship during its term. A single reformation of the land-
lord-tenant relationship may result in both. See, e.g., Zuzak v. Querbes, 193 So. 258
(La. Ct. App. 1939).
86. See notes 10 supra and 87 infra.
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tion of the lease will not affect the broker; he already has an unconditional
right to commissions based on the total rents payable under the original
agreement.87 But if the broker has contracted to receive compensation only
"if, as, and when" rental is paid, his commissions will be adjusted in accord-
ance with changes in the lease.
88
Computing the broker's commission under an "if, as, arid when" contract
may be difficult when renegotiation of the lease has changed the kind of con-
sideration passing to the landlord. To take a simple example, suppose that the
tenant originally promised to make rental payments in cash to the landlord.
After renegotiation the lease calls for the same cash payments, but the tenant
also assumes the landlord's obligation to pay taxes on the property. Clearly
each tax payment made by the tenant is part of the new "rental." Under the new
arrangement the tenant pays more for his occupancy, and the landlord realizes
more net income from the property. The broker's commissions after the re-
negotiation should be computed as a percentage both of the cash payments and
of the tax payments.89 But other situations do not seem as clear. Suppose
that the original lease called upon the tenant to make cash rental payments
and also to pay water, electricity, and other utilities charges. The landlord
paid the broker a percentage of cash rentals received. 90 Upon renegotiation
the tenant agrees to pay larger cash rentals, while the landlord agrees to pay
the utilities charges. It would seem unfair to allow the broker to collect his
percentage computed on the entire cash payments, since the landlord has
assumed an additional expense. On the other hand, if the landlord is allowed
to deduct one expense before computing the broker's post-renegotiation com-
mission, courts might be tempted to allow him to deduct other expenses as well.
If so the broker would be paid only a percentage of the landlord's net income
-a result not reflecting the value of the new relationship and hardly con-
templated -by a contract calling for a percentage of "rentals."'
87. The broker is entitled to his commission when -his part of the brokerage contract
is performed. Typically, his performance merely requires finding a tenant "ready, will-
ing, and able" to lease the premises. See note 10 supra. His contract may require less.
Cf. Mechem, The Real Estate Broker and His Commissions, 6 ILL. L. Ray. 145, 238,
313 (1911-1912). It may require more. See page 669 supra and note 88 infra. But if
the tenant is completely unable to meet his lease obligations, this might affect the initial
finding of the 'broker's performance-finding an able tenant. WALKER, op. cit. suJpea note
1, § 221f.
88. See, e.g., Davis v. Nichols, 124 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
89. Since the total amount of future tax payments probably cannot be accurately
computed, the broker will either have to postpone collection of his commission, or agree
to take an amount based on an estimate of future taxes. Real Estate Boards which sug-
gest that lessee-paid taxes be included in total rents recommend the latter solution. See
REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEw YoRx, CoMmisS1ox RATES AND RULES Rule 7 (1952)' (cur-
rent year's taxes used unless new construction involved). See also rules for Indianapolis,
Indiana, cited in MCMicHAEL, op. cit. sapra note 7, at 549.
90. This is the typical arrangement. But sometimes non-cash items are included in
total rent. See, e.g., note 89 supra.
91. If a determination of the meaning of the term "rentals" in the original brokerage
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These two examples serve to suggest some of the problems which may
arise in determining what constitutes the "rental" of which the broker is to
receive a percentage after renegotiation. In addition, problems of evaluating
non-cash items may be encountered.0 2 The provisions which may be written
into a lease and then shuffled in a renegotiation are legion. 3 Any attempt to
formulate a comprehensive definition of "rental" would be quixotic. But
courts should not limit that term to cash payments made directly by tenant
to landlord. Rather, in figuring the broker's commission, they should de-
termine what real economic change the renegotiation has wrought. In each
case judicial conscience should be the guide.
If the tenant's use of the leased premises has been successful, renegotiation
may entail the leasing of additional premises. The broker will probably collect
no commission for such an extension unless he has specifically contracted for
such a contingency. 4 Even an explicit contract calling for commissions
upon expansion may present difficulties. If the agreement specifically refers
only to expansion of the original lease, the parties may forestall the broker's
claim by executing a second lease for the additional property. And a contract
drawn broadly enough to embrace new leases of any additional property may
run afoul of judicial dislike for theoretically limitless recoveries.03 Such an
agreement might be deemed an attempt by the broker to collect a commission
upon any second lease between the same parties and involving land in the
vicinity-whether or not contiguous with the original premises. Even if
brokers never made such an extreme claim, general language might result in
recovery for leases not directly a product of the original lease's success. The
most equitable and easily administered solution would apparently be to deny
the broker recovery for new leases of additional premises unless he has ex-
contract were involved, the question to whose benefit the landlord's expenditure accrued
might be relevant See Loeb v. Viviano, 202 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. App. 1947) (cash pay-
ments used by landlord for improvement of premises held not "rent"). But here the only
issue is how to adjust the broker's commission, which is to be computed from a certain
base, when the elements that make up that base have been changed. It is submitted that
here only the utility charges should be deducted from total rentals.
92. See note 89 supra. Other non-cash items may require evaluation. Where the
lessee erects an improvement its value may be added to the total rentals. But valuation
of the improvement my entail complexities. The improvement may be made for the sole
benefit of the tenant, and may be valueless at the end of the lease term. But the improve-
ment, even in that instance, may be of value to the lessor as security. Nmmss & Fxsnrn,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 23.
93. Some of the provisions most commonly included in leases are: payment of taxes,
insurance, making of repairs, and improvements. See BEN=iarr, op. dt. spra note 42,
Apps. I, II, VIII. For an example of reshuffling see, Ernest A. Carrere's Sons v. Levy,
191 So. 747 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
94. For an example of such a contract see E. 0. Bailey & Co. v. Union Planters
Title Guaranty Co., 33 Tenn. App. 439, 232 S.W.2d 309 (1949).
95. See page 677 supra. Courts might formulate their objections in terms of failure
of consideration. See page 673 supra.
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pressly written into his contract a provision naming individually the piece or
pieces of adjacent property for the rental of which he will be compensated. 0
TRANSFER OF INTERESTS IN THE LEASED REALTY
The long-term nature of modern business leases makes it likely that, at
some time during the term, the party who originally contracted to pay the
broker will transfer his interest to another-by assignment, gift, or descent.
And payment of the broker's commission for creating such a lease is
often deferred. 8 A broker may, therefore, seek commission recoveries after
the original parties to the lease have passed their interests to transferees. Few
cases have been reported which deal with brokerage claims in this context. And
deduction from doctrinally analogous cases yields no sure clue to future de-
cisions. Such uncertainty troubles brokers who hold contracts calling for
further commissions upon continuation or extension of lease relationships
currently in existence.99
If, after a change in parties to the lease, the broker's compensation is not
paid, he can bring a contract action against the party who originally promised
to pay him.100 But such a suit may be brought only after a breach,10 1 and
then only for damages already suffered.102 To recover continuing commissions
96. In certain cases this solution might produce difficulties. If, for example, a lessee
whose rental is measured by gross sales leases additional selling space, merely agreeing
to pay the same percentage of the anticipated rise in sales, computation of the broker's
commission might entail additional accounting problems.
97. This may not be true in the case of institutional landlords. See note 4 supra.
But it is true of individual landlords and of most business tenants, whether incorporated
or not. See Comment, 48 YALE L.J. 1400, 1411 (1939). For a general discussion of the
problems relating to transfer of leasing parties' interests, see BENNETr, oP. cit. supra note
42, §§ 276-8, 283-6.
98. See page 669 supra.
99. INTERVIEWS.
100. The broker's claim is a contract claim and not an interest in property. See
page xxx infra. Hence, transfer by a landlord or tenant of the duty to pay the broker
does not extinguish the transferor's obligation. 2 WILLISTON, CoNTAc'rs, § 411 (Rev.
ed. 1936).
101. Breach generally will consist of non-payment of commissions when they become
due. In many jurisdictions no action can be based on an anticipatory breach when the
plaintiff has fully performed his part of the contract. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRAcrs, § 1296
(Rev. ed. 1936). Such a rule would exclude most broker's claims. But the better rule is
not to deny actions for anticipatory breach to parties who have fully performed. 4 CoIRnN,
CONTRACrS, § 962 (1951). However, since an action based on an anticipatory breach re-
quires a clear and unequivocal repudiation, id. § 973, brokers are unlikely to be able to
utilize this remedy, especially since an assignor's repudiation does not necessarily mean
an assignee will not perform.
102. See Manufacturers' Furniture Co. v. Read, 172 Ark. 642, 290 S.W. 353 (1927).
However, the broker might be able to prove anticipatory breach of future obligations oil
the basis of the breaches which have already occurred. See note 101 supra. But if future
compensation depends upon the contingency of the tenant's paying rent or renewing,
recovery might be denied either on the ground of the uncertainty of the breach, or the
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in this manner the broker must embark upon a series of suits against a person
who may have withdrawn from the lease relationship long ago 'L3 -and who
may be presently unavailable or financially irresponsible.
The broker frequently seeks to obviate the necessity for recurrent suits by
writing into the original brokerage contract an "acceleration" clause.- 1t In
such a provision the promisor agrees that if he transfers his interest in the
leased property, he shall pay the broker a specified lump sum.103 Thus the
promisor becomes liable as soon as he leaves the lease relationship-a time
when he is available and when his funds may be augmented by the proceeds
of sale.108 But in order to replace continuing commissions, the liquidated
damage provision must grant the broker a healthy sum. The part, employing
the broker may refuse to sign such a contract. The size of a single cash
payment may be prohibitive. In addition, the promisor may object to paying
an amount computed on the supposition that the lease relationship will con-
tinue to be successful when later events may indicate a lack of success10-
Conversely, the broker may object to a sum based on the equally arbitrary
supposition that the success of the relationship will diminish.
In view of the difficulty the broker may have in collecting from the original
promisor, he frequently must look for his commissions to the transferee
who has succeeded to the original promisor's interest. But the trans-
feree is not bound to perform the brokerage contract unless he actually or
constructively consents to do so.10s A recital in the brokerage contract that
it shall bind successors and assigns is not enough to make the transferee liable
-even when the transferee knows of the brokerage contract and the broker's
uncertainty of the plaintiff's damages. See Manufacturers' Furniture Co. v. Read, Msupa.
Cf. Mabery v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 173 Kan. 5S6, 250 P2d 824 (1952). But
cf. 5 CoaRsi, CoNTcrs § 1025 (1951).
103. Breach may not occur until long after the original promisor vithdrew from the
relationship. For example, the original landlord's interest may be transferred to another.
The broker may seek a commission only years later, upon the tenant's renewal of the
lease or purchase of the property. See, e.g., Heard v. Miles, 32 Tenn. App. 410, 222
S.W.2d 48 (1949). As to the possibilities of suing the transferee in this situation, see
pages 631-5 infra.
104. Inmvivws.
105. Instead of a specific sum, the brokerage agreement may call for a payment upon
transfer computed, for example, by finding average Tast commissions and projecting them
over the years remaining in the lease. Of course, such a computation does not evaluate
the probabilities of renewal
106. The parties may agree to have the liquidated damage clause apply in the event
of the promisor's death. Then funds would not be available from a sale of the interest
in realty. But other advantages to such a provision remain. The broker's claim against
the estate becomes readily dischargeable. See note 123 in! ra.
107. See text at note 35 supra.
108. Wood Fabricators v. Hayes, 250 Ala. 475, 35 So2d 106 (1948); Ernest A.
Carrere's Sons v. Levy, 191 So. 747 (l.a. Ct. App. 1939) ; Masten Realty Co. v. James,
125 NJ.L 529, 16 A.2d 464 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1940).
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claim.' 00 Only by introducing extrinsic evidence of consent will the broker
be able to hold the transferee. In many cases at least, such independent assent
will be non-existent or impossible to prove.
In an attempt to overcome the consent requirement the broker often writes
his contract into the lease as a covenant. 110 If the lease stipulates that it shall
bind successors and assigns and if the broker sees that the lease is recorded,"'
perhaps that should be sufficient to make the transferee liable. But under
current doctrine recovery seems doubtful. 112 The promise to pay the broker,
though stated in the lease, is treated as a collateral personal covenant granting
the broker no interest in the realty.1 3. Hence the covenant must still be en-
forced on contract rationale."1
4
109. The recital in the brokerage contract is not enough, by itself, to bind the trans-
feree. Since the transferee is not a party to the contract, no consent can be implied from
it. See Glenn v. Canby, 24 Md. 127 (1866) (mortgage with similar recital). On the effect
of such recitals, see 4 CORBIN, CONTRACrS § 871 (1951).
Nor can the transferee's consent be implied from knowledge of the existence of the
leasehold. Comly v. First Camden National Bank & Trust Co., 22 N.J. Misc. 123, 36
A.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1.944); Masten Realty Co. v. James, 125 N.J.L. 529, 16 A.2d 464
(Sup. Ct. N.J. 1940).
At the time of the assignment of the promisor's interest in the leased realty it is im-
probable that any further performance by the broker will still be due the party that promised
to pay him. See note 2 szpra. Hence, there will be no assignment of rights from which to
imply the assignee's consent to assume the obligation to the broker. Cases involving tile
obligation of a mortgagor's assignee to pay the mortgage are analogous. Assumption
of the obligation is said to require conclusive evidence of assent. See WILTSIE, MoRT-
GAGE FoRECLOsuREs § 219 (5th ed. 1939). Inference even from knowledge of the assign-
ment clause in the agreement is doubtful. See Peoples Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Brinkoet-
ter, 263 Ill. App. 391 (1931). Merely by purchasing mortgaged realty, the grantee does not
become liable to pay the mortgage indebtedness. The property merely remains subject to
the mortgage lien. See WILTSiE, op. cit. supra § 218.
110. INTERvIEws. See, e.g., agreement in Bacharach v. Mitnick, 121 N.J.L. 401, 3
A.2d 92 (1938).
111. Long term leases are recordable in all jurisdictions. 4 AMERICAN LAW 01
PRoPERTy § 17.8 (Casner ed. 1952).
112. Cf. Wood Fabricators v. Hayes, 250 Ala. 475, 35 So.2d 106 (1948) ; Comly v.
First Camden National Bank & Trust Co., 22 N.J. Misc. 123, 36 A.2d 591 (Sup. Ct.
1944) ; Bacharach v. Mitnick, 121. N.J.L 401, 3 A.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
113. Ernest A. Carrere's Sons v. Levy, 191 So. 747 (La. Ct. App. 1939); See
also Sheild v. Welch, 4 N.J. 563, 73 A.2d 536 (1950) ; 4 CoaiWN, CoNTRAcrs §860 (1951).
114. Recording of the lease probably does not alter the result. The effect of recording
an instrument recordable under the recording statutes is to give constructive notice of its
contents. It is doubtful whether a separate brokerage contract would be recordable under
the statutes. See 2 PO.MEROY, EuITY JURISPRUDENCE § 646 (1941.). And recordation of
an unrecordable interest is not constructive notice to transferees. Sjoblom v. Mark, 103
Minn. 193, 114 N.W. 746 (1908). Moreover, notice of an instrument creating or convey-
ing an interest in realty is not notice of collateral matter contained in the instrument. 2
PomERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 629 (1941).
However, recording the brokerage agreement with the lease may make a showing of
consent easier, as it may result in actual notice to the transferee.
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'When the broker's contract appears in the lease he may attempt to argue
that the transferee, in succeeding to the original promisor's interest in the
realty, succeeded also to the obligation to pay brokerage commissions. In the
commonest situation the original landlord has hired the broker and covenanted
to pay commissions. There the covenant, although appearing in the lease, may
be interpreted as a direct promise to the broker.1 15 When the landlord later
sells to a third party, the purchaser will undoubtedly agree to accept the
landlord's property subject to the lease." 0 Such a sales contract, the broker
would argue, constitutes the transferee's promise to the landlord to perform
all the obligations which the lease imposes on the landlord, including the cov-
enant to pay brokerage commissions. The broker could seek enforcement
on the theory that he is a third-party beneficiary of the sales contract.1 1 7 A
similar theory could be spelled out where the tenant has hired the broker,
covenanted to pay him, and later assigned his leasehold. But because the
promise to pay commissions is a collateral personal covenant, 18 courts may be
hesitant to infer the transferee's consent to pay the broker from the agreement
to take the property subject to the lease. The broker's right is at least so
questionable that litigation is bound to ensue.
In some instances the tenant has hired the broker, but as part of the leasing
arrangement the landlord agrees to pay brokerage commissions." 0 Collecting
such commissions from the landlord's transferee will be even more difficult.
Absent an express contract, the tenant would have been liable to pay the
115. Courts have talked of a broker's suit against the promisor in such a situation as one
by a third-party beneficiary. See, e.g., Tapscott v. McVey, 83 N.J.L. 747, 85 Ad. 343
(1912). But since the landlord was obligated to the broker, his promise to pay, even if
made to the tenant, is in effect merely a restatement of his direct obligation to the bro!:er.
The promise here is not made for the tenant's benefit, or at his request.
116. The landlord may sell his reversion, and his rights under the lease, including
unaccrued rents, separately. One who purchases only the reversion will have no obligations
under the lease. Hence it is unlikely that he will assume the obligation to pay the brozer.
117. If an assignment contract contained a specific promise by the assignee to pay
a broker to whom the assignor is liable, the broker would be a typical creditor beneficiary
and could enforce the assignee's promise. See Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). The
fact that the broker's claim may be contingent or merely payable in the future would not
affect the result. 4 Coamx, CoNrM.%CTS § 787 (1951); RESTATmENT, CoAZNTA AcTs § 134
(1932).
Despite continuing judicial suspicion of third party beneficiary doctrine, the over-
whelming majority of American jurisdictions permit creditor beneficiaries to recover
directly against a promisor who agreed with a debtor to pay the beneficiary. 4 Conam;,
ConmAcrs § 788 (1951). And even those states which repudiate third party beneficiary
doctrine permit the beneficiary to bring an equitable creditor's bill against the promisor
in aid of the beneficiary's action against his debtor. Id. at 113-114. Where a mortgagor
assigns his interest, all states but Massachusetts have permitted the mortgagee to enforce
the promise, made by the mortgagor's assignee to the mortgagor, to assume the burden
of the mortgage. 2 WILLISTON, Cox.qmrcrs § 383 (Rev. ed. 1936). And the law in Mass-
achusetts is not clear. Ibid.
118. See note 113 supra.
119. See note 12 supra.
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broker. 120 Hence the landlord's promise to pay, if written into the lease, will
be interpreted as a covenant in favor of the tenant. The broker is the third-
party beneficiary of that promise. He may be permitted to enforce the cov-
enant against the original landlord. 121 Upon sale of the landlord's interest, the
sales contract might be said to incorporate the transferee's promise to perform
the brokerage covenant. But courts may hold that only the tenant can enforce
the covenant against the landlord's transferee; he-not the broker-is the
thi'rd-party beneficiary of the sales contract. As to that contract the broker
is a beneficiary twice removed: the third-party beneficiary of a covenant in
favor of the tenant, who in turn is third-party beneficiary of the transferee's
contract to buy. As such, the broker stands in a poor position to enforce the
payment of commissions.
122
Where the transfer of interest in the leased realty is accomplished by gift,
bequest or intestate succession there is no assignment or sales contract to be
enforced by the broker against the transferee. Under these circumstances the
broker must argue that the original promisor had a personal obligation to pay
commissions and that the transferee assumed that obligation in taking the
property interest. 123 Tenuous at best, this argument may be treated with
severity.
120. See notes 10, 14 stpra.
121. The broker is a prototype creditor beneficiary. See note 117 supra.
122. Courts suspicious of intricate third party beneficiary claims might refuse en-
forcement merely by holding that the broker is not in '"privity" with the transferee, But,
of course, no third party beneficiary is ever in privity with the party he seeks to sue.
The broker could argue that his plea does not differ from that of a mortgagee who seeks
to enforce a promise, made by a remote transferee of the mortgagor, to assume the
obligation to pay the mortgage. Such pleas have been upheld wherever all intermediate
transferees of the mortgagor promised to pay the mortgage. 2 WILisroN, CoNmitAcrs
§ 386 (Rev. ed. 1936). In both situations, the plaintiff (broker, mortgagee) sues a de-
fendant (landlord's assignee, remote assignee of the mortgagor) on a promise made to
another (landlord, intermediate mortgagor) who in turn had promised the plaintiff's
debtor (tenant, mortgagor) to pay the obligation.
Nor does allowing the broker's claim in this situation make a promisor liable to more
than the two parties usually involved in a third party promise-the promisee and the third
party beneficiary. And the broker is a creditor beneficiary of the assignee he seeks to sue.
Hence, no extension of third party beneficiary doctrine is really necessary in order to
permit the broker's recovery.
123. Of course, if the successor agrees to pay the broker, he can be held. See note 108
supra. But if no consent can be shown, the broker may nevertheless have a remedy. At
the death of the promisor, his estate becomes liable for the broker's commission. Lyzie
v. Warriner, 44 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1950). If the broker proves an unmatured claim against
the estate, the administrator may pay him, set up a fund to cover his claim, or get heirs
to give a bond securing payment of the obligation when it becomes due. ATKINSON, Wu.MS
699 (1953). If the broker's claim is contingent, however, such treatment by the promisor's
administrator may not be feasible. In such a case, courts often permit liquidation of the
estate, without disposition of the claim. A subsequent suit against any heir is then
allowed. See cases cited id. at 802. For a discussion of whether a contingent claim will be
barred if not filed within the period of administration, see id. at 700-02.
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Apart from doctrinal deficiencies, writing the brokerage contract into the
lease may be infeasible. The leasing parties may refuse to sign an instrument
containing such a promise. Some fear that a covenant to pay the broker may
establish an encumbrance on the realty. Or they may simply feel that such a
proviso, because it leaves the liability of assignees in doubt, will constitute an
obstacle to free transfer. Although such views may be over-cautious, they
have caused leasing parties to keep brokerage covenants out of some leasesY2-4
In addition to creating the lease relationship, the broker may contract with
the landlord to manage the leased premises and collect rent.12 In Pennsyl-
vania the broker's ability to get commissions from a transferee is assured when
he holds such a management contract. Pennsylvania courts hold that in enter-
ing the contract the landlord assigned to the broker a "vested right" to un-
accrued rental.12 6 When the landlord later transfers his interest in the leased
premises, he gives his successor only his reversion, his rights and duties not
connected with collection of rents, and a contract right to receive from the
broker rental payments minus brokerage commissions. Even without the trans-
feree's consent, the broker can keep his commissions as rent is paid.I- But the
"vested right" doctrine may curb efficient use of the realty. The broker's
"vested right" to rentals deprives the landlord and tenant of their capacity
to alter or cancel the lease without the broker's appro-al.2 The doctrine
secures the broker's claim, but only at the cost of flexible land use.
The broker's enforcement problems can be avoided also by giving the broker
part ownership of the property in lieu of commissions. The broker then
would have a perpetual right to share in the property's earnings and in the
124. INTnMVIMVs.
125. For a description of activities involved in professional management of real
estate, see BENSON & NORTH, REAL ESTATE PrINcirLEs &N Prcms 272-go (Rev. ed.
1938).
126. Heynann v. Fourth Dickerson Building Ass'n, 113 Pa. Super. 26, 171 At. 482
(1934); Taylor v. James, 36 Del. Co. Rep. 39 (Pa. Comm. P1. 1949). In each of these
cases, the broker had the duty of collecting rents. He took his commission out of the
rents collected.
127. The Heyminn and Tolor cases held that under the brokerage agreement, the
broker was assigned the right to the unaccrued rentals as security for his commissions;
hence, the landlord could no longer assign the right to another and the broker could
not be deprived of his "property right" to collect rents and retain commissions therefrom.
Heymann v. Fourth Dickerson Building Ass'n; Taylor v. James, supra note 126. Typi-
cally, contracts for collection merely create an agency relationship, even if the agent has
the right to take his commissions from the collected funds. See Mrfciras, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 69.
128. The right to collect accrued rentals is security for the broker's commission.
Heymann v. Fourth Dickerson Building Ass'n, supra note 126. Mortgagees who have a
right to collect unaccrued rentals as security for mortgage payments can prevent re-
negotiation of the mortgage. See Landberg v. Equitable Investment Co., 292 Pa. 476,
141 Atl. 302 (1928); Mercantile and Theatres Properties, Inc. v. Stanley Co., 346 Pa.
343, 30 A.2d 136 (1943). The court in the Heynmvm case rested its decision on the Land-
berg case. Heymann v. Fourth Dickerson Building Ass'n, supra note 125, at 30, 171 At].
at 483.
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proceeds of any sale. 120 But landholders are reluctant to split the fee interest,
because multiple ownership seriously hampers alienation.3 0 Fee ownership
could be kept intact if a corporation were formed to hold the property. The
broker could participate in earnings by holding stock, while the owner could
alienate his interest freely by selling his own shares. But funneling earnings
through a corporation subjects them to double taxation 1,31-a high price for
the owner to pay merely for the broker's benefit. Whether the fee interest is
split or the property held in corporate hands, real estate owners may well
object to a device which grants the broker a permanent right to share in earn-
ings, even after the expiration of the lease relationship which the broker
created. For these and a multitude of other reasons less clearly defined, many
owners do not want to dilute their ownership interests.
1,3 2
Critique of Existing Remedies
The transfer by a leasing party of his interest in the property is not an
appropriate occasion upon which to sacrifice the broker's ability to collect
commissions. Such a transfer does not reflect a decrease in the value of the
lease relationship. It therefore should not cut off the remedies by which the
broker can collect for his services.
To be sure, the broker can always sue the party who originally promised
to pay him.' 3 But that right is hollow when the original promisor is financial-
ly unsound or cannot be found. Furthermore, forcing the broker to seek re-
covery from one who has departed from the lease relationship seems inequit-
able. Brokerage commissions should be deemed a part of the continuing cost
of occupying or owning income-producing property. Such expenses should be
paid by a party currently enjoying the benefit of the lease. Both in order to
grant the broker an effective remedy and to apportion fairly the expense of
brokerage commissions, the broker should be allowed to recover from the
transferee of the original promisor.
129. It is also possible expressly to assign the broker the interest which the Penn-
sylvania courts impute to him when a management contract is made. See note 127 supra.
Such an assignment will give the broker a property interest. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY
§ 881 (3d ed. 1939). But unless the broker has the right to collect the rentals, the assign-
ment will merely give the broker a chose in action. 1, TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT
1107-8 (1914). Assigning the broker the right to unaccrued rentals and contracting to
receive from him the excess of rentals over his commissions is dangerous for the land-
lord, however. He is now merely the promisee of a contract and is subject to difficulties
of enforcement against the broker's assignees.
130. In order to transfer the complete fee interest, or to renegotiate the lease, the
broker's consent would be required. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 6.10, 6.11 (Casner
ed. 1952).
131. See 7 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcO~m TAXATION § 38.01 (1943).
132. But when the landlord's interest is held by a group of investors, it may be ad-
vantageous to permit the broker to take his commission in the form of a part of the
equity interest, especially where he is an investing member of the group. See, e.g., Kahn,
Profile-Closings and Openings I, The New Yorker, Feb. 13, 1954, p. 38.
133. See note 100 supra.
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The methods by which the broker can presently attempt to impose liability
on the transferee are unsatisfactory. If the broker has a separate brokerage
contract he can hold the transferee only in the unlikely event that the trans-
feree agrees to assume the liability to pay.134 When the broker's contract
is written into the lease, recovery is still speculative.135 The "vested right"
rationale arms the broker effectively but goes too far in preventing efficient
use of the leased property.13 Giving the broker part ownership also guarantees
him a return, but his permanent participation in earnings may constitute ex-
cessive compensation. 137 And property owners may well object to dilution of
their ownership interests.
Current law should be altered to afford the broker a remedy against the
transferee which is effective but which will leave the leased property as freely
marketable as possible. A partial solution would be for courts to hold that a
promise to pay brokerage commissions, if incorporated in the lease, is a coven-
ant running with the land.las Squaring such a result with current doctrine,
however, would require ingenuity. To run, a covenant must "touch and con-
cern" the land.139 The duty to pay the broker could be said to meet that
requirement only on the highly questionable theory that the broker's services
benefitted the land by producing an efficient use. And a covenant will not run
unless performance of the burden is a benefit to the covenantee.'4 0 Absent a
doctrinal gyration, the covenant would meet this requirement only where the
tenant hired the broker but the landlord agreed to pay his commissions, or
vice versa.' 4 ' In any event, the extreme novelt, of conferring the stature of
property on a simple contract for personal services may foretell the doom of
any such proposal.
Doctrinal problems could be solved, of course, if the promise to pay com-
missions were made to run with the land by legislative mandate. But again
the novelty of the idea might kill it. Even if legislation were passed it would
help the broker only when he could write his contract into the lease. Leasing
parties might still refuse to incorporate the contract into their lease.' 42 A cov-
enant running with the land is clearly an encumbrance on the property. The
obligation imposed on transferees could be reflected in the price upon sale
of interest in the leased premises. But presumably many transferees would
134. See note 103 supra.
135. See pages 682-4 supra.
136. See text at note 128 supra.
137. See page 686 supra.
138. Such a decision would require any person holding the promisor's interest in the
leased property to pay the broker. See CLARK, COVaNANTS AND OTnR INI.EESTS WiucH
RUN WITH THE LAND 2-4 (2d ed. 1947).
139. Id. at 96-100.
140. For analysis and criticism of this requirement, see id. at 101-111.
141. In that event, the landlord's covenant is to the tenant's benefit, since the landlord
assumes the tenant's obligation to pay the broker. See note 12 sipra.
142. Only when it appears in the form of a promise by one of the leasing parties to
the other can the agreement be considered a covenant.
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prefer to pay a set sum and take the property free of the brokerage obligation
rather than buy the property for less but become liable to pay commissions of
unascertained amount. Leasing parties, feeling that the alienability of their
interests will be hampered, may avoid the covenant running with the land by
keeping the broker's contract out of the lease. Hence the covenant doctrine
could never be a complete cure for the broker's problems.
The broker's claim could be secured if he were given a recordable lien on
the leased property. No matter where the promisor goes, the property is avail-
able. To be sure, granting the broker a lien would not require the transferee
to promise payment of the broker's commissions. But the interest in the realty
would be subjected to the lien. In order to avoid continued harassment
through enforcement of the lien, the transferee would be forced either to pay
the broker himself or to procure substantial assurance that the original promis-
or would continue to pay. In either case the broker's continued recovery is
guaranteed.
Although a broker's lien may be established by agreement, 143 courts cur-
rently refuse to create such liens by judicial process. 144 They often hold that
the broker's action against the original promisor is adequate. 14 Under similar
circumstances statutes granting materialmen's and mechanics' liens have been
enacted.146 Legislative creation of a broker's lien seems in order. The basic
provisions of such a law should include the following.147
143. Such an agreement would create an equitable lien. I JONES, LIENs § 27 (3d ed.
1914). The lien would give the broker an interest in the leased property superior to that
of other creditors, but it would not assure enforcement against assignees. The broker
could collect from all assignees of the promisor, except bona fide purchasers who took
without notice of the lien. 5 TIFFANY, RE.AL PROPERTY § 1559 (3d ed. 1939). For a
discussion of the strict requirements for the creation of such a lien, see JoNEs, op. cit.
supra, §§ 30-5.
144. Judicial creation consists of implying an agreement to create a lien in certain
situations. Courts refuse to imply such liens from agreements merely fixing the broker's
compensation at a percentage of sales or rentals. See JoNEs, LIENs § 48 (3d ed. 1914) ;
Note, 125 A.L.R. 921 (1940). See also Garrett v. Esperanza Mining Co., 93 N.J. Eq. 149,
115 Atl. 381 (1921). But courts will imply an equitable lien where the broker is to re-
ceive a share of the rents or purchase price. See, e.g., Zerkle v. Hendon, 180 Ala. 209, 60
So. 834 (1913). Such a result is likely in situations closely approximating that in which
the Pennsylvania courts utilize the vested rights theory. See note 129 supra. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Cooper, 201 App. Div. 639, 194 N.Y. Supp. 726 (2d Dep't 1922).
145. Phillips v. Catts, 206 Ala. 594, 91 So. 579 (1921) ; Nicol v. Bressler, 159 Fla. 668,
32 So.2d 457 (1947) ; King v. Wells, 100 Fla. 588, 130 So. 38 (1930).
146. For examples of comprehensive mechanics' lien statutes, granting a lien on real
estate to any contractor who has done work to improve that real estate, see ILL. STAT. ANN.
c. 82, §§ 1-39 (Smith-Hurd, 1936) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, §§ 1-268 (Purdon, 1930).
147. A broker's lien law, like a mechanics' lien statute, must deal with a host of
ancillary problems, such as appointment of receivers, apportionment of costs, judicial
sale of realty interests, and the procedure for bringing suit on the lien. For examples
of provisions dealing with these problems, see statutes cited note 146 supra. In peripheral
areas the problems raised by a broker's lien are not essentially different from the problems
covered by mechanics' lien laws. Hence no attempt will be made here to draft a compre-
hensive set of provisions. Reference may be had to mechanics' lien statutes.
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"Section 1. A broker who performs services in connection with the
creation of a lease of real property shall have a lien on all the interests
in the leased property held by the party who has promised, by ex-
press or implied contract, to pay such broker for such services.
Such lien shall not be void, in whole or in part, because the right
of the broker to be paid is made contingent by the terms of such con-
tract or because the amount to be paid thereunder is unascer-
tained.148 Such lien shall attach on the day upon which the realty
is leased.
149
"Section 2. A broker shall have the right to file record of a lien
granted by Section 1 of this Act on the day upon which it attaches
or -ithin ten days thereafterlco Such recordation shall constitute
constructive notice of such lien and shall render such lien thereafter
enforceable against any or all of the interests to which it attaches,
whether or not the holder of any or all of the interests against which
the lien is enforced is the party who promised to pay the broker.2
1'
"Section 3. If payment is not made to a broker having a lien granted
by Section 1 of this Act of any amount when such amount is due
under the terms of the broker's contract, the broker may bring
suit to enforce his lien to the extent of the amount then due, in any
court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the leased
property is located. 1' The bringing of such a suit shall in no way
prejudice the right of the broker to bring suit at a later time to the
extent of further payments, due at that later time under his contract
but not made.
"Section 4. A lien granted by Section 1 of tis Act shall not be en-
forceable to the extent of any payments which became due more than
148. This sentence is designed to protect the broker who holds an "if, as, and when"
contract, who has a right to a percentage of variable rentals, or who has the contingent
right to additional compensation if the lease is renewed. If such a broker brings his lien
before a court to enforce payments due near the beginning of the lease, he should not run
the risk of having the court void the lien as to future payments simply because the amount
of those payments or the broker's right to them is uncertain at the time of the first suit.
149. A broker who has found a party "ready, willing, and able" to lease may be en-
titled to compensation even though the premises are never leased. See text at notes 10,
11 supra. The sentence appearing in the text intentionally denies the broker a lien in
that event. If the party hiring the broker is the prospective tenant, he has no interest in
the premises until the lease is signed. If the owner of the property has hired the broker
to find a tenant, there would be a property interest upon which to affix the lien. But where
no lease is signed it seems wise to limit the broker to his remedy against the party who
hired him. It is undesirable to place an encumbrance on the property for the benefit of
a broker whose efforts did not even succeed in initiating a lease relationship.
150. The object of the ten-day limitation is to preclude the broker from embarrassing
the party who promised to pay him by filing his lien just as the promisor is about to sell
his interest in the premises. If the broker has not recorded after ten days, the -ale can
proceed in the assurance that the purchaser will be free of any broker's lien.
151. The "any or all" language in this sentence is designed to prevent the promisor
from emasculating the broker's lien by splitting his interests in the realty among several
transferees, none of whom would have the same interest in the premises as that which
the promisor had. But see text at note 157 infra.
152. This sentence is based on a section of the Illinois mechanics' lien law. ILL. STAT.
ANN. c. 82, § 9 (Smith-Hurd, 1936).
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two years before suit is brought to enforce the lien with respect
to such payments.163
"Section 5. The holder of any interest to which a lien granted by
Section 1 of this Act has attached may notify the person then own-
ing such lien to commence suit thereon. If within 60 days after
receiving such notice in writing the owner of such lien fails to bring
suit to enforce such lien to the extent of all payments then due, the
lien shall be void and unenforceable to the extent of such pay-
ments.
54
"Section 6. The term 'broker' as used in this Act shall mean any
person licensed as a real estate broker under the laws of this
state.
155
"Section 7. The term 'interests' as used in this Act shall include the
contract right to receive rentals,16 as well as any property right
or interest, legal or equitable, which exists upon the creation of a
lease. It shall not include the interest held by a sub-lessee."
15 7
This law is designed to allow enforcement of the broker's lien at any
time when commission payments are due, despite the fact that original leasing
parties have transferred their interests to others. But it is also designed
to make the broker's lien as small an encumbrance on the leased realty as is
consistent with effective enforcement. Although the lien remains in existence
as long as commissions are or may become due, Section 4 prevents the broker
153. See discussion of this section, pages 690-1 infra.
154. This section is patterned after a provision of the Ohio mechanics' lien law. OHIo
GEx. CODE § 8319 (Page, 1937). The Ohio statute provides further that the person who
notifies the lienor may record such notice on the docket provided for the recordatlon
of mechanics' liens. Ibid. The purpose of allowing such recordation is to provide evidence
concerning the date on which notification was given and to give a later purchaser of the
property notice that he is free of mechanics' claims arising before the notification.
For further discussion of this section, see page 691 infra.
155. At one time or another, at least 33 states have licensed real estate brokers. See
SEmENov, op. cit. mipra note 5, at 17.
Defining the persons who may obtain a lien according to licensure may allow a
licensed broker who is also an attorney representing one of the leasing parties to obtain
a lien to secure payment of his legal fees. Allowing such a result, although not witlin
the central purpose of the statute, seems preferable to complicating the statute by attempt-
ing to define the precise services for the payment of which a broker can secure a lien.
156. The right to receive rentals is one of the landlord's most valuable rights. The
landlord may split his interests and give one transferee the right to rentals but not the
reversion. Similarly the tenant may sub-let the premises and then pass his right to
receive rentals and his right of re-entry to different transferees. The provision of the
statute should preclude the argument that the broker's lien can not be affixed to the
right to receive rentals because that right is not "property." See note 129 supra.
157. It seems unfair to allow the broker to tie up the interests of sub-lessees, who
probably had no contact with the broker and did not benefit directly from his services.
The possibility that the premises will be leased to a straw man and immediately doled
out to a sub-lessee does not make the broker's lien ineffectual. According to this section
of the statute, the broker can impose his lien on the tenant's right to receive rents from
the sub-lessees, if the tenant has promised to pay the broker. See note 156 supra.
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from using the lien to enforce a stale claim for commissions due years earlier.
And the Section assures that a lien which secures periodic payments due
under an "if, as, and when" contract will not build up over a period of years
into a large burden on the property. Section 5 allows the party against whose
interest a lien has attached to initiate a judicial determination of the broker's
rights; he does not have to wait for the broker to bring suit of his own accord.
Thus a party who wishes to contest commission payments can do so, and yet
give a potential buyer assurance that all commissions have been paid up to
the date of sale-without delaying sale until the broker brings suit of his own
accord. Such a lien law seems to strike a fair balance between enforcement
for the broker and a minimum of encumbrance on the leased property.
